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The conveners have asked us to reflect on the significance of the round table
format, given its role in the history of a particular round table during the momentous
political changes of 1989/90. My response to the question as applied to the Central
Round Table of the GDR is twofold. On one hand, I wish to give credit to the
Central Round Table which is often seen as not having fulfilled its aspirations.
Given the particular structural context in which the round table was operating, it was
remarkably successful and achieved more than could have been anticipated given
its weak legitimacy and power base, in particular, providing a sense of stability and
moral guidance in tumultuous times.  On the other hand, my thesis is that it was
unable to exert a major influence on what was to follow, neither in the short-term
or long-term. In particular, – and in marked contrast to the situation in Hungary and
Poland – what happened at the round table left hardly any trace in the collective
memory of Eastern and Western Germans.
There seems to be remarkably little scholarly literature on the GDR round table.
The main works are by Uwe Thaysen who was an observer at the round table who
edited a multi-volume verbatim record of its meetings (Reviewed here). Of particular
interest of the readers of this blog are the contributions by Ulrich K. Preuß, who had
been asked to serve as a consultant for the constitutional sub-committee. He has
published about his experience and about the implications of what happened for
constitutional theory (here and here).
Comments from round table participants such as this one from the social-democratic
delegate in the constitutional sub-committee often convey a strong sense of
disappointment that the recommendations of the round table were not heeded after
the new elections. In particular, it was felt that it was wrong that the newly elected
Parliament of the GDR rejected outright the draft of a new constitution for the GDR,
which the round table had adopted at the last session of the round table in February
1990. But the situation in early spring 1990 was very different from when the round
table started two months earlier, and the revolutionary legitimacy that it initially
enjoyed had faded away in the meantime.
Let’s quickly review the chain of world-historical events that led to these elections.
The GDR round table is unthinkable without the developments in Poland and
Hungary. The Polish round table between the government and the opposition met
from February to April 1989, and the Hungarian, from March to September. The
model was therefore well established when the regime of the SED hardliners started
to unravel. In early summer, opposition activists were able to prove that the local
elections had been manipulated. The summer was dominated by West German
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TV coverage of GDR citizens crossing the now open border from Hungary into
Austria and climbing over the walls of the West German embassies in Budapest,
Prague, and Warsaw. October sees the pompous 40th anniversary of the GDR
anniversary with the visit of the Soviet leader Gorbachev who made clear that he
was not going to back the hardliners in the GDR government. The turning point came
shortly afterwards, when peaceful mass demonstrations in Leipzig were not bloodily
suppressed in a “Chinese solution.” Mid-October already, Erich Honecker resigned
as General Secretary. However, the old regime was not able to regain the initiative,
for at least three reasons: First, it was completely discredited and could not present
any new credible personnel. Second, on November 9th, the wall fell, and there were
no more obstacles for GDR citizens to migrate to West Germany, where they could
apply for immediate citizenship. Finally, at the end of November, West German
Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced a plan for a confederation of the two German
states, with the eventual aim of a reunification. In the eyes of a large majority of
the population, the prospect of a swift political and economic integration into the
prosperous western German state made any alternative option of an independent,
but impoverished GDR unattractive.
On December 7th, the first meeting of the GDR Central Round Table was held. It had
15 members from the government, 15 members of the opposition and help public,
televised sessions, operating on a consensus principle. It established subcommittees
working on broad range of topics, one of which was tasked to produce the draft
of a new constitution. In contrast to the Polish and Hungarian round tables, where
the results of a future election were quite uncertain, government and opposition
did not meet to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement in the coming democratic
regime. The GDR was already in dissolution, and even though the government was
still in control of the machinery of state, it was no longer able to use this machinery
to keep itself in power. The demonstrations on the street were generally peaceful,
but threatened to turn chaotic (think of the storming of the Stasi headquarters).
The members of the round table reported that given the economic situation, the
continuous loss of workforce, and a combination of rising dissatisfaction and loss
of control, there was a palpable sense of collapse, even civil war. In this situation,
the round table, pushed by the representatives of the opposition, provided moral
leadership. That the previous regime had already mostly abdicated its will to power
is evident in the fact that the old parliament passed most of the “recommendations”
of the round table as law without debate, and that the government reported to round
table and generally followed its instructions. However, the power of the opposition
was based on the ability to mobilize mass demonstrations. This worked only as
long as popular sentiment was in line with the aims of the opposition: such as the
providing order, organizing free elections; or dissolving the state security apparatus.
When interests diverged, this influence declined rapidly. This was particularly visible
in the question of independence of the GDR: government and opposition delegates
were united in their wish to preserve, at least for some time, an independent GDR,
whereas the slogans on the streets soon changed from “We are the people” to “We
are one people”.
At the height of its influence, the ongoing economic and demographic crisis elevated
the round table to a form of co-government, which provided invaluable assistance to
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preparing the country for the difficult transformation into a democratic state governed
by the rule of law and into a market economy. But this influence soon waned. In
January, eight members of the opposition joined the government as ministers without
portfolio. It seems like they did this out of a sense of responsibility, hoping, among
other things, that it would improve the reputation of the GDR leadership particular
in its negotiations with the West German government. This hope was misplaced,
since the Kohl government did not intend to help the makeshift GDR government
in any major way. Kohl had his eyes set firmly on the outcome of the elections.
The move weakened the opposition since it blurred the line between government
and opposition representatives. Most importantly, once the election date was set,
a split arose within the opposition at the round table: a split between “moral” actors
which were interested in promoting a particular vision of the public good and the
“political” actors which intended to run in the election and therefore had to act and
communicate more strategically. The consensus and unity of the early round table
two months earlier was gone.
The result of the March elections is well-known: the conservative “Alliance for
Germany”, which had run on a platform of quick re-unification with West Germany,
gained 48% of votes. The opposition groups represented at the round table failed
to clear the 5% threshold needed to enter parliament. The new majority in the
parliament did not feel the need for the draft constitution that the Central Round
Table has bequeathed to it – quite the opposite: it was feared that adopting a new
constitution would be detrimental to reunification, since it would breathe new life into
the GDR which, in their view, was bound to wither away soon.
In sum, the influence of the Central Round Table was limited to the period leading
up to the first election. Given that its power base and political legitimacy was
precarious, it fulfilled its role of controlling the government remarkably well. Reasons
for this success was the very specific habitus the members of the opposition which
were not interested in gaining positions of power for themselves and the complete
disorientation of the regime. Both factors are tied to the very specific historical
moment. This severely constrains what we can learn from the Central Round Table
for the current predicament of democratic backsliding in East-Central Europe. On the
other hand, we can ask what legacy the round table left for the current equivalent
of democratic backsliding in Germany: the spectacular rise of the “Alternative for
Germany” party (AfD) in East German federal states, which represents not only
people with right-wing conservative and illiberal viewpoints but with also clearly
politically extremist and authoritarian agendas. And again, the round table has left
hardly any footprints in the German collective memory, positively or negatively, at
least compared with its Polish or Hungarian siblings. The reasons are clear: the way
history proceeded was very much determined by factors which were decided before
it even held its first session: once unification was on the table, there was nothing
the round table could do to bind the decision of the electorate. The reasons for the
growing political dissatisfaction of many in East Germany are complex and beyond
the scope of this statement, but it seems clear that the history of the round table,
provides no narrative for extremists to exploit. Whether round table formats can be
used to overcome the poisonous, and increasingly visible political polarization of
German politics remains to be seen.
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